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As I write, we have the same Home Secretary as yesterday.  But it might have been 
different.  Yesterday, amid claims he had misled the public, a series of calls were made 
for the resignation of British Home Secretary Charles Clarke. As is common in such 
cases, the precise basis of the resignation calls remains slightly confused.  What is clear is 
that Clarke had been publicly confronted on 25 April 2006 with the fact that a significant 
number of foreign nationals imprisoned in the UK had, on completion of their sentence, 
been released into the community rather than deported (as they should have been, 
according to a procedure already laid down). In his defence, Clarke pointed out that most 
of what was being talked about had taken place before he himself became Home 
Secretary. When pressed (during an evening interview for BBC2’s Newsnight) on 
whether any prisoners had been mistakenly released after he had become Home 
Secretary, Clarke said he didn't have the number in front of him, so he was 'not prepared 
to say no one' but he could say it was, 'very, very few people'.  Later the same evening, 
however, it emerged that the Home Office had already issued figures showing that 288 
prisoners had been mistakenly released in the period since Clarke had become Home 
Secretary, out of a total of approximately a thousand.  In the House of Commons and in 
subsequent media interviews, Clarke was accused of having misled the public by 
suggesting that he personally was responsible for only 'very, very few' prisoners being 
wrongly released. As was later pointed out in the House of Commons, official figures in 
fact showed that the rate of release of such prisoners had increased after Clarke was 
appointed, rather than the problem being at that point effectively over.  
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Calls for Clarke's resignation followed, expressed by some in terms of the 
incompetence of his department and leadership, and by others in terms of the more 
specific allegation that he had knowingly misled the public during the Newsnight 
interview.  This second allegation is more personally incriminating, since it calls into 
question Clarke's integrity and so suitability for present or future office. Being based on 
an interpretation of what he said, this allegation of misleading the public forms what I 
find it helpful to call a ‘meaning troublespot’. 
The term ‘meaning troublespot’ is of course not a technical term. It is based on 
what I take to be a suggestive analogy between the personal, social and financial cost to 
protagonists in disputes about meaning in the public sphere and the social damage which 
results from directly physical conflicts.  Disputes at such troublespots, where specific 
interpretations are contested, create a sort of interpretive gridlock: apparently no 
movement is possible in any direction, since nobody is willing to concede that an 
alternative meaning or significance of the disputed utterance is reasonable or even 
possible.  Such disputes typically involve competing, alternative interpretations of a 
contested word, phrase or passage; and, significantly, there is rarely, if ever, a shortage of 
perceived meaning. What is contested instead is a crux that gives rise to alternative 
meanings between which some kind of arbitration needs to take place if anyone is to 
move on.  
The ‘meaning troublespot’ crux in this instance, of course, is whether 'very, very 
few people ' is consistent with 288 out of a total of nearly one thousand, roughly a third.  
'Few' is relative, and 288 is certainly 'few' in relation to the national or global population. 
But when the numeric value of ‘few’ (let alone ‘very, very few’) is in the hundreds, and 
amounts to approximately one-third of a contextually definite overall number, it seems 
arguable that speech-community intuitions will not support the idea that this number can 
be glossed as 'very, very few'.  Those intuitions of the speech community might 
incidentally be tested in a variety of ways, not only through direct elicitation but also 
through less direct, constructed experiments; and in the relevant published literature, the 
American linguist Michael Geis, for example, undertook an extensive study of the 
intersubjective consistency of so-called scalar implicatures prompted by quantifiers such 
as ‘few’ and ‘many’ in TV advertising as far back as the 1970s.1 
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Interestingly, Charles Clarke’s repetition of the intensifier 'very' in the phrase 'very, 
very few people' suggests that the number is not only small but also 'minimal' in the sense 
of being vanishingly insignificant. This is an intended rather than an accidental 
suggestion.  The technique Clarke adopts here, of leading up to the phrase 'very, very few 
people' with the preliminary suggestion that he is 'not prepared to say no one', may be 
viewed as a strategy to draw attention to the speaker’s scrupulousness: the speaker 
signals reluctance to commit himself to a specific number because he can’t be confident 
that number is accurate, before going on to commit himself to an alternative. This is a 
sort of making explicit – in case anyone might not think it of a politician – of Paul Grice's 
quality maxim in communication: that a speaker says (only) what he or she has grounds 
for believing to be the case, with the conversationally important spin-off that inferences 
about the truth or falsity of related possible states of affairs can be reliably inferred, as 
implicatures. Drawing explicit attention to the speaker’s integrity or probity is contrived, 
in this case, to reinforce the low number likely to be inferred when the speaker does 
commit himself to the general estimate, 'very, very few'. Compare the odd effect, for 
instance, of he was 'not prepared to say no-one but could say it was one-third of the total 
number'.  
Embarrassing for Charles Clarke, certainly, but rather grand to call this a ‘meaning 
troublespot’?  Some people would say so.  They might argue that you don't need to 
analyse such a comment in detail to see it is misleading. It is clearly, they would say, a 
deliberate deception by Clarke to cover his own backside; and you don't need a PhD to 
grasp that. (This argument for a ‘common-sense’ approach to meaning attribution is 
influential not only in everyday conversation, as it happens, but is also found in legal and 
regulatory approaches to determining meaning.) The benefit in saying straight out that 
Clarke’s utterance is a deception, so the same people would suggest, is that of plain 
speaking: misleading people is no more than you would expect – that’s what politicians 
do when they’re on the ropes, so why mess about with proving it in minute detail?2  More 
important to get on with the real business of life: the issue isn't whether Clarke tried to 
cover up the figure of 288 – that's just the knockabout of professional politics – but about 
potentially dangerous prisoners being released into society: an ongoing public safety 
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issue that has already cost lives. We should therefore focus our minds on things that are 
actually happening rather than retreating into semantics.  
This is partly true, but the point remains that not everyone will agree with the 
account offered so far of Charles Clarke's utterance, and we don't have clear ways of 
arbitrating between alternative interpretations or investigating the issues at stake.  People 
more sympathetic to Charles Clarke, for instance, counter the reading outlined above with 
the notion that, with the national prison population in the tens of thousands, 288 could be 
construed as 'very, very few people'; and in an aggressive media environment set on 
pulling down public figures, Clarke could be said to be acting understandably in trying to 
put an acknowledged difficulty in his department in perspective. What’s to be gained, 
anyway, by trying to show that, faced with genuinely urgent problems in the world, one 
comment by a public figure during a TV interview doesn't match how all the members of 
its audience feel it’s reasonable to describe something? Would anyone seriously want 
some sort of regulatory quango – a kind of semantic French Academy – to decide what 
specific number range is consistent with the expression 'very, very few'? Even linguists 
wouldn’t, the argument might continue in more academic form, because to do so flies in 
the face of what we know about how meaning is typically modulated or calibrated in 
given contexts inferentially, rather than coming with an already fixed value: Quine's 
syncategorematic  ‘poor violinist’ is not only different from a violinist who is poor, but, 
as modern lexical pragmatics has shown, will differ in musical ability depending on 
whether they are a poor violinist in a national orchestra or in a school pick-up band.
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The notion of 'meaning troublespot' emerges, then, from irreconcilability between 
competing interpretive accounts. Any such meaning troublespot, as you would expect, is 
about meaning: about how the strategies adopted by a speaker (whether an individual 
person or corporate ‘speaker/author’), reflected in the choice of a certain form of words, 
direct the meaning that a listener will form, with those meaning effects distinguished 
from other, usually more general interpretations that consist of beliefs held almost 
irrespective of anything the speaker might have actually said.  At the same time, such 
meaning troublespots are never only about meaning: they are always just one part in – a 
subplot of – some larger struggle over money or other form of capital.  They are usually 
embedded in a longer piece of discourse, hedged around with other debatable comments 
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and ideas, and so dependent for meaning on features of their context in a particular 
publication or media broadcast; and this makes them difficult to isolate for close attention 
in their own right.  Even where identifiable precisely, the meaning question at such 
‘meaning troublespots’ will normally seem less important ultimately than the issues it 
refers to (in this case, potentially dangerous prisoners on the streets); and there is 
typically a question of whether someone complaining about public discourse does so 
because of an aggressive agenda of their own, as tabloid newspapers and polemical 
journalist clearly sometimes do.  Often we don't get to know what the outcome of a 
meaning dispute is, either, because the interpretive crux is so tangled up with other issues 
that the overall situation finally moves on without the specific issue of meaning ever 
being resolved. 
There are general issues to do with ‘meaning troublespots’, nevertheless, that give 
them an importance beyond any individual case. Meaning troublespots expose the 
important, underlying issue of what kind of communicative environment we think we’re 
living in. Is it the situation of general trust, with only marginal problems of fraud and 
deception, that Onora O'Neill eloquently outlined in her 2002 Reith lectures?
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 Or is it 
naïve to imagine, especially in the hardball worlds of politics and commerce, that public 
figures and bodies keep to some standard of truthful communication, when ‘effective’ 
communication within a more pragmatic, neo-liberal worldview has risen so rapidly and 
so far up the public agenda, and when politicians in particular view themselves as 
embattled in relation to aggressive media adversaries (as Peter Oborne has convincingly 
shown is the case with New Labour
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)?  In a context of demonstrated, widespread loss of 
trust in public communication, should we be thinking of public communication less (or 
perhaps only residually) as a matter of Gricean cooperation and more a matter of spotting 
a speaker’s relevant self-interest – with claims to honesty in the public sphere heralding 
not Tony Blair's new start in public life but a new twist in meta-rhetorical cynicism? 
We can only wait and see.  In the meantime, ‘meaning troublespots’ may well 
remain of interest only to pedants who retreat into semantics and to legal ambulance-
chasers. But  it would be better if they became something that interests us all, as everyday 
questions of meaning that are an inevitable dimension of issues people prefer to think of 
as to do with ‘real events’.  
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Will we have the same Home Secretary tomorrow? When asked directly whether he 
knew the number of prisoners released on his watch was actually 288 at the time he took 
part in that crucial Newsnight interview, Clarke replied simply and professionally that 
during the interview he didn't have a sheet of paper in front of him with the number on it 
(6). 
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view is still Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. (Brighton: Harvester 
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within political scandals that may begin by seeming to be about something else, such as sex or 
fraud. Roger Shuy’s Bureaucratic Language in Government and Business (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998) traces a related phenomenon – evasive and opaque 
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 Discussion of just how fluid and variable lexical meanings are is especially associated with the 
work of François Recanati (e.g. his much-discussed discussion of ‘rabbit’ as contextually an 
animal, meat, fabric, etc.); the section on word meaning in William Croft and Alan Cruse’s 
Cognitive Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) gives an accessible, 
alternative account of problems in discriminating word senses. Ray Gibbs’s Intentions in the 
Experience of Meaning. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) examines processes 
of meaning attribution across many different fields, including law, literary criticism and art 
appreciation. 
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 Baroness O’Neill’s 2002 Reith lectures can still be heard at www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/, 
but were also published as Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
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 It is easy to dismiss Peter Oborne’s The Rise of Political Lying (London: Free Press, 2005) as a 
journalistic hatchet job; but it is full of striking miniature case studies and develops an 
interesting historical argument about New Labour’s communication excesses. Nicholas 
Jones’s blow-by-blow accounts of New Labour lying, such as The Control Freaks: How New 
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6.  Ten days later (on 5 May 2006), Charles Clarke was sacked from his post as Home Secretary 
in a cabinet re-shuffle. By this time, however, whether he had misled the public on this or similar 
occasions had become of interest to I am not prepared to say no-one but to ‘very, very few 
people’. 
 
